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Abstract
We study market games with multiple posts per commodity. We provide some facts
that characterize prices of commodities across posts and show the following results: (i)
As the number of agents increases, the price variability across posts for a commodity
becomes smaller and it becomes zero when the number of agents becomes innite,
irrespectively of the distribution of characteristics in the economy. (ii) The set of
equilibrium prices and allocations of a market game is a subset of the set of equilibria
of another game with more trading posts per commodity. (iii) We demonstrate via an
example that the inclusion can be strict, as there are equilibria with price disparities
across posts for a commodity which cannot be captured with less trading posts. (iv)
One can pass from an equilibrium of a market game into an equilibrium of a game
with less trading posts per commodity, by consolidating posts where the price of a
commodity is uniform.
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1 Introduction
The standard setup of market games -see [1] [7] [8] [3] [4]- is based on the
concept of trading posts where individuals submit orders for purchases and sales
of commodities. The orders that reach each trading post are aggregated and
commodities are distributed to individuals in proportion to their orders. Thus,
a structure of trading posts must be postulated at the outset of a market game,
so that we have a way to match orders for purchases and sales. In the absence of
some friction, such as transaction costs etc, the particular structure of trading
posts might at rst seem irrelevant. However, as it has been demonstrated in
[2] the strategic market game is not robust with respect to the structure of
trading posts postulated at the outset of the game: with more trading posts
there are equilibrium proles of strategies, allocations and prices that cannot
be captured by the single trading post model. Surprisingly enough this result
does not depend on liquidity constraints or any other structural elements of the
market game. It is clearly due to the lack of perfect competition, since such
phenomena never arise in the competitive framework. But why does the lack
of perfect competition, manifested by the small number of traders with non
negligible eects on price formation, render some relevance to the structure of
markets? This question has motivated the study in this paper.
In this paper we provide some general analysis of the multiple posts mod-
el. We rst provide a simple characterization of equilibria with multiple posts,
which claries the reason for the relevance of the structure of trading posts:
equilibria are compatible with the presence of limited arbitrage opportunities
across posts. Thus, the introduction of additional posts is not redundant be-
cause it gives rise to further arbitrage opportunities. The concepts of 'arbitrage'
and 'equilibrium' might perhaps sound like a contradiction in terms. However,
as we show via an example, as in [2], it is possible that arbitrage opportunities
exist in equilibrium but they cannot be protably exploited by individuals. In
the example featured in this paper there is an equilibrium where commodities
are exchanged simultaneously in two posts at dierent prices. However, any con-
templated eort to exploit the price dierence by shifting orders across posts
(e.g. from the expensive to the cheap) does not provide any benet. The reason
for this is as follows: due to the imperfectly competitive nature of the model any
such eort to exploit arbitrage opportunities, induces changes in prices. The
key idea is that since agents are also sellers, the change in prices causes income
eects that are detrimental for the benets of this shift. Hence, we conclude
that equilibria are indeed compatible with the presence of arbitrage.
The natural question that arises is what limits the extend of arbitrage that
can exist in equilibrium. In other words, is it possible to obtain an estimate of
the arbitrage opportunities that can occur in equilibrium as a function of the
data of the economy? Further, what can be said about arbitrage in equilibrium
asymptotically as the number of agents becomes large? The main result of this
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paper is that 'large' price disparities across posts for a commodity, are compat-
ible only with 'small' sets of agents. In particular, when the number of agents
tends to innity, prices across posts converge to a common limit regardless of
the characteristics present in the economy. We believe that this is the appropri-
ate result in this context because the relevance of the structure of trading posts,
which is only an institutional matter, should not hinge on the characteristics
of the economy. In this way we can conclude that in a frictionless context, the
lack of perfect competition is the only source of arbitrage in equilibrium. This
conclusion is important for yet another reason: in a way this constitutes a proof
that the correspondence 'one commodity-one price' is indeed a law in the sense
that it obtains asymptotically irrespectively of the sequence of economies and
the corresponding limit. In order to keep things in perspective, our result has
no implication whatsoever regarding the nature of the common limit of prices.
In particular, this common limit need not be a competitive price. Indeed, in the
context of market games the common limit could be zero, which typically is not
compatible with competitive equilibria. In conclusion, our result shows that an
arbitrarily large number of agents implies that equilibria are characterized by no
arbitrage. However, the lack of arbitrage itself does not suce to characterize
perfect competition. Apparently some further qualications are necessary for
this. On the other hand, this result allows us to conjecture the possibility of
some asymptotic equivalence result between market games with multiple posts
and competitive equilibria.
Finally, we show two results regarding the number of trading posts in a
market game: First, that the equilibria of the single trading post model are
equilibria for the model with multiple posts and more generally, the set of equi-
libria of a model with any number of posts is embedded into any model with
more trading posts. Thus, by augmenting the number of trading posts we do
not 'lose' any equilibria. Second, by consolidating trading posts where prices of
a commodity are equal we can obtain an equilibrium for a model with less trad-
ing posts. In particular, every equilibrium in a model with many posts where
the 'law of one price' holds (namely, prices are uniform across all posts for each
commodity) is an equilibrium for the single trading post model. However, as
our example shows, the inclusion of the set of equilibria of the standard game
into market games with more trading posts can be strict.
We proceed with our analysis as follows: Section two introduces a multi-
ple posts version of the model in [3] and in [4]. In section three we establish
some conditions that characterize the distribution of prices across posts for each
commodity. In section four we develop an example and provide a theorem on
the relationship between the numer of agents, the number of trading posts for
each commodity and the maximal possible price discrepancy across posts for
a commodity. Section ve features some results on the structure of equilibria




Let H be a nite set of agents. There are L commodity types in the economy
and the consumption set of each agent is identied with <L+. Each individual
is characterized by a preference relation, which is representable by a utility
function uh : <L+ ! <, and an initial endowment eh 2 <L+. An economy is
dened as E = f(<L+; uh; eh) : h 2 Hg. Throughout the rest of the paper I will
employ the following assumptions:
Assumption 2.1 eh >> 0 for each h 2 H.
Assumption 2.2 Preferences are convex, C2, dierentiably strictly monotone1
and indierence surfaces through the endowment do not intersect the axis.
Trade in this economy is organized via a system of trading posts where indi-
viduals oer commodities for sale and place bids for purchases of commodities.
A possible scenario for the rules of exchange which is attributed to [3] is pre-
sented below. The interested reader should consult the original source for a
detailed account of this formulation.
2.1 Trade via inside money
In this setup bids are placed in terms of a unit of account. Let Ki be a positive
integer denoting the number of trading posts for each commodity i = 1; 2; : : : ; L.
in this way the structure of the market game underlying this economy is char-
acterized by the vector k = (Ki)
L
i=1.















h  eih; i = 1; 2; : : : ; Lg:
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n . Transactions in each
trading post clear through the price pi;s = Bi;s=Qi;s. A commodity allocation is










































where it is postulated that all divisions by zero equal zero2.
1i.e., if u represents  then for all x 2 <L++, @uh=@x
i > 0 for each i = 1; 2; : : : ; L
2It should be emphasized that this is a benchmark model. The restrictions on oer strate-
gies could be written dierently. For example one might allow individuals to make oers up
to their whole endowment in each trading post. Other restrictions with dierent implications
are also conceivable.
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: (bh; qh) 2 Skh
)
(1)
An equilibrium is dened as a prole
n
(bh; qh) 2 Skh : h 2 H
o
that forms a Nash
equilibrium.
Notice that, due to the bankruptcy rule above, in an equilibrium with posi-







































Given an economy E it will be useful to denote by Ek the market game which
is characterized by k = fKigLi=1 trading posts. According to this notation E1,
where 1 is the L dimensional vector with coordinates equal to 1, is the standard
market game with a single trading post per commodity. Furthermore, we denote
by NE(Ek) the set of Nash equilibrium strategy proles of the game Ek and by
E(Ek) the set of consumption allocations that correspond to the elements of
NE(Ek).
We report here two elementary facts that will be useful in the development.
In what follows we consider an equilibrium of our economy, where at least






i;s  qi;sh denote the net trade in commodity i from trading post s for
an individual h 2 H.
Fact 2.1 Consider a budget feasible prole (b; q). If bi;sh  qi;sh > 0, there is a
budget feasible (b̂h; q̂h) with b̂
i;s
h  q̂i;sh = 0 such that net trades and clearing price
remain unchanged. Conversely, if bi;sh  qi;sh = 0 and bi;sh + qi;sh > 0 there is a
budget feasible (b̂h; q̂h) with b̂
i;s




Fact 2.2 Consider a budget feasible prole (b; q), where bi;sh = q
i;s
h = 0 and
p
i;s
> 0. Then there is a budget feasible (b̂h; q̂h) with b̂
i;s
h  q̂i;sh > 0, which results
in the same net trades and clearing price.
Proof:
This is a simple consequence of the fact that every individual can be viewed
as making a 'wash' sale in the trading posts where he is non-active. Suppose







> 0, this agent
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in this way z
i;s





















. In other words the
allocation and price remain the same with this transformation in the strategy
of individual h. It is easy to verify that the new strategy is also budget feasible
2
3 Characterization of equilibria
In this section we present some elementary facts about equilibria with many
trading posts. We begin with the following proposition that characterizes equi-
librium prices in two trading posts for a commodity:
Proposition 3.1 In equilibrium, the prices between every pair of trading posts























; 8h 2 H
Proof:
Notice that the statement is trivially true if one or both prices are zero, so it
remains to prove it for the case where pi;s  pi;r > 0.
Consider any individual h 2 H. By facts 2.2 and 2.1 respectively, this agent
can be considered active on both trading posts r and s for commodity i and




that is best response to (B h; Q h) and denote by B and Q the corresponding






























 dbi;sh = 0 (4)


































































The equation above describes the changes in the nal holdings of commodity
i, for feasible 'shifts' in the bids and oers on the Ki trading posts. Now, in
equilibrium it must be the case that dxi  0 for all dbi;sh and dqi;sh where s 6= r.

















2 = 0; 8s 6= r
























Furthermore, notice that the conclusion is independent of the best response
chosen for individual h. Since the same must be true for all individuals our
claim is proved 2
Corollary 3.1 In equilibrium, for each pair of individuals h 6= k and each pair


























Remark 3.1 Notice that the above condition implies that there are at most
H 1 independent equations per pair of trading posts for each commodity, that
must be satised in equilibrium.
Finally, we have the following conclusion regarding the relationship between
the prices in two trading posts for a commodity.













, for some h 2 H.
Remark 3.2 It should be clear from the above corollary that in an atomless
economy prices across all active posts would be uniform. However, if we consider
sequences of economies with an increasing number of agents, the asymptotic
convergence of price distributions across posts needs some careful consideration.
Corollary 3.3 If in equilibrium zi;rh = z
i;s
h = 0 for some h 2 H then pi;s = pi;r.
Notice that the above results do not guarantee the equality of prices in two
posts in general. In fact, we have the following result.
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Proposition 3.2 If in equilibrium we have zi;sh  zi;rh  0, where
zi;sh + zi;rh  6= 0




h  0 and zi;rh > 0. By fact (2.1) it can be assumed that bi;rh > 0,
q
i;s




















































Thus, we conclude that pi;r < pi;s 2
Corollary 3.4 There is no equilibrium where for some pair of agents h; k 2 H





k = 0 .
Proof:
Suppose that such an equilibrium exists and let pi;r; pi;s be the clearing prices in
the two posts. Without loss of generality suppose that zi;rh > 0 and z
i;r
k < 0. An
application of proposition 3.2 to agent h implies pi;r < pi;s. A similar application
to agent k implies pi;r > pi;s, a contradiction 2
Remark 3.3 The last corollary excludes the possibility of equilibria where two
disjoint subsets of individuals trade a commodity in dierent posts.
The proposition above gives a sucient condition that guarantees the in-
equality of prices in two trading posts. It is not clear however that indeed there
exist equilibria where this condition holds. Therefore, in order to highlight the
signicance of multiple trading posts, we provide an example in the next sec-
tion, which demonstrates the possibility of distinct equilibrium prices for some
commodities.
4 Equilibria with non-uniform prices
4.1 An example
The example that follows features an equilibriumwith two distinct positive prices
for each commodity. In this way the idea of multiple trading posts becomes
meaningful.
Our example consists of three agents H = 1; 2; 3 and three goods L = 1; 2; 3.
We postulate two trading posts for each commodity. The consumption set of
each agent is thus <3+. For reasons that will become clear shortly we do not
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specify the utility functions of agents at this point. Finally, endowments are
given as follows:
e1 = (55=9; 123=9; 92=9) ; e2 = (123=9; 92=9; 55=9) ; e3 = (92=9; 55=9; 123=9)
First consider the market for commodity 1. It can be veried that the
following strategy prole satises equation (6), so given the strategies of any
two agents it is impossible for the remaining agent to increase his net trade in



































































= (1; 2; 3)






















































Hence, with this prole of bids and oers, the consumption allocation of









= (10; 10; 10)
By rotating the indices in the strategy prole above we can do the same in





































































= (2; 3; 1)

















































































= (3; 1; 2)












Thus, each agent ends up with consumption:
x1 = x2 = x3 = (10; 10; 10)
Furthermore, from the way the strategies have been constructed, the proposed

































































It remains to nd utility functions for each agent, so that the above prole of
strategies is a Nash equilibrium. To this end recall that the rst order conditions































































































































It easy to show that in view of (11) and (12), which the proposed prole of
strategies satises by construction, the marginal rate of substitution between
commodities i and j that satises any one of the above equations, will automat-
ically satisfy the rest also. Hence, in order to determine the marginal utilities


















; where i 6= j:
However, only two of the three equations of this system are independent. Thus,
we can x the marginal utility of, say, commodity 3 at an arbitrary level and
calculate the corresponding marginal utilities of commodities 1 and 2 that solve
the system. Certainly, the same can be done for each agent. In this way any util-
ity function which is concave and its gradient takes the values calculated above
at the point (10; 10; 10), will be a solution to our problem. Upon substitution









































































Now, by assigning values to the marginal utility of commodity 3 as well as
the initial and nal utility levels -taking care so that the nal utility is higher
than the initial one- we have, for each agent, a system of three partial dier-
ential equations with three conditions, which characterizes the set of functions
that solves our problem. Thus, we have a characterization of the family of u-
tility functions for which the proposed allocation is a Nash equilibrium. This
fact also demonstrates in an informal way the robustness of our example. For















































4.2 Asymptotic behavior of price disparities
Clearly price disparities are due to the nite number of traders and the presence
of multiple trading posts. It is natural then to wonder in which way price
disparities are related to the number of agents, the number of trading posts or
any other primitives of the economy. The following results are devoted to this
question.
Let (b; q) 2 NE(Ek) be any non-uniform equilibrium. It can be assumed
without loss of generality (see proposition 5.2 in the next section) that trading
posts with the same price have been consolidated. Thus, Ek, where k is such that
Ki > 2 for some i = 1; 2; : : : ; L, is the game with the minimumnumber of trading
posts for which x(b; q) 2 E(Ek). We may further assume, by renumbering posts
if necessary, that pi;1 = min fpi;r : r = 1; 2; : : : ;Kig. Dene:
g





  1 : r = 1; 2; : : : ;Ki
)
We have the following lemma:
























































































































Since the same inequality is true for each h, we conclude that
8h 2 H; p
i;r
pi;1




























: r = 1; 2; : : : ;Ki
)
:
Finally, the conclusion of the lemma follows by taking the supremum of the
lefthand side of the last inequality 2
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Theorem 4.1 Let (b; q) 2 NE(Ek), where k is such that Ki  2 for some
i = 1; 2; : : : ; L. We have:
(i) Given  > 0; we have : #H  (Ki + 1)
 p
1 + p
1 +   1
!
) gi(b; q)  
(ii) If #H > Ki + 1 then g
i(b; q)  (Ki + 1) (2 #H  Ki   1)
(#H  Ki   1)2
Proof: We show the contrapositive of (i). Suppose that gi(b; q) > .



















From the lemma above we have that gi(b; q)  2  h + 2h for all h 2 H, from
which it follows that h >  1 +
p
1 +  = (), 8h 2 H. From the denition













> () for some
r = 1; 2; : : : ;Ki. Thus, we have:















for some r = 1; 2; : : : ;Ki:
Let V =





























 1, so #V < 1+()
()








[V , so #H PKir=1#Vr+#V < (Ki + 1) 1+()()

.






Finally, the second claim of the theorem follows now directly by solving the
last inequality for , taking into account the hypothesis #H > Ki + 1. In this
way we have for any  > 0:
g
i(b; q) >  ) (Ki + 1) (2 #H  Ki   1)
(#H  Ki   1)2
> ;
which implies the statement of claim (ii) 2
The implication of the last theorem for the asymptotic behavior of price
disparities is crystalized in the corollary that follows4.
Consider a sequence of economies and associated market games Eknn where
#Hn ! 1 and a sequence (bn; qn) 2 NE(Eknn ). Dene zn = #Hn=Kn + 1,
where Kn = maxfKni : i = 1; 2; : : : ; Lg.
Corollary 4.1 zn !1 ) gi(bn; qn)! 0 for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; L.
Proof: Since zn !1 we have that eventually zn > 1, so according to the above
theorem




4The statement of this corollary has been suggested to me by J-F Mertens.
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Thus, as zn !1 we have gi(bn; qn)! 0 for each i = 1; 2; : : : ; L 2
We conclude that 'large' price disparities across posts of a commodity are
compatible only with a limited number of agents. As the number of agents
becomes large then price disparities across posts of a commodity tend to zero,
at a rate that depends only on the relative number of agents and trading posts,
provided that along the sequence there are more agents than trading posts.
In particular, the distribution of characteristics along the sequence is irrelevant!
Although this conclusion might seem odd, the intuition behind it is clear: 'small'
agents can take advantage of price disparities just as well as 'large' agents.
Thus, the distribution of endowments and preferences should not be relevant
to the degree of price variability. This result seems encouraging for the study
of asymptotic convergence to the competitive model. Although from a formal
point of view the above theorem is not quite an equivalence result, it does
hint that the common limit of prices across all posts of a commodity will be
competitive.
5 Equilibria with uniform prices
It can be shown that every equilibrium allocation of the standard model with
a single post per commodity can be obtained as a uniform equilibrium of the
model with multiple trading posts5. This fact ensures that we do not 'miss' any
equilibria by augmenting the number of trading posts. We provide here a proof
for a game with two trading posts per commodity. The proof can be extended
to the general case via an inductive argument.
Consider the market games E1 and E2 (where 2 is the L dimensional vector
with all coordinates equal to 2). Let x 2 E(E1) be an equilibrium allocation
corresponding to the strategy prole f(bh; qh) 2 S1h : h 2 Hg. For each index
i = 1; 2; : : : ; L choose 0 < ti < 1 and consider the prole f(b̂h; q̂h) 2 S2h : h 2 Hg





ti  (bih; qih) s = 1
(1   ti)  (bih; qih) s = 2
Notice that this strategy prole results in a uniform distribution of prices across
posts for each commodity and the same commodity allocation x as in the game
E1.
Claim 5.1 The prole of strategies (b̂h; q̂h)h2H constructed above is an equilib-
rium for the game E2. In particular x 2 E(E2).
Proof: See appendix.
Proceeding in the same way as above one can establish the following result:
5This fact is also an indirect existence proof for our model.
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Proposition 5.1 Given two vectors with positive integer coordinates k; t 2 <L
where t  k, we have E(Ek)  E(Et).
Remark 5.1 This result gives an alternative view to the appearance of trivial
equilibria in this class of market games: If, according to our notation, we denote
by E0 the market game with no trading posts (hence autarky is the only equilib-
rium) then E(E0)  E(E1)  E(E2)  : : : In this way the no trade equilibrium
is 'implanted' into all subsequent models.
The next result establishes that the converse inclusion holds if one connes
attention the set of uniform equilibria.
Proposition 5.2 Let x 2 E(Et) be uniform,i.e., there is a unique price that
clears all the trading posts where each commodity is traded. Then x 2 E(Ek)
for all k  t. In particular, x 2 E(E1).
Proof: See appendix.
6 Conclusion
In summary we conclude that this much is true: Every equilibrium of the market
game with a single post can be obtained as an equilibrium of the market game
with multiple posts. Furthermore, given an equilibrium of a game with multiple
posts, the consolidation of strategies over all posts with equal prices is an equi-
librium for a model with fewer trading posts. In particular, the set of uniform
price equilibria is invariant with respect to the number of posts. On the other
hand there are equilibria of the game with multiple trading posts which cannot
be captured by the market game with one trading post. These are equilibria
where the 'law of one price' fails. The appearance of such equilibria is entirely
due to the lack of perfectly competitive conditions in trade. As the number
of agents increases the price variation across posts for a commodity becomes
smaller.
Thus, imposing on the general exchange context any number of trading posts
seems to be the source of two problems: First, the appearance of trivial equilibria
which can be viewed as being inherited from the game with no trading posts.
This observation hints that trivial equilibria appear because trading posts are
imposed rather than evolve in the model. Second, that the set of equilibria
of the model depends on the structure of trading posts that one imposes. In
particular, the single trading post model excludes non-uniform equilibria.
The central message of this paper is that there is a need to elaborate on
the concept of trading posts. The structure of trading posts determines the
dimensionality of the strategy sets of agents in the underlying game. Thus,
alternative structures of posts give rise to a variety of games that dier in
their strategy spaces, so from an abstract game theoretic point of view it seems
14
natural that the set of equilibria depends on the structure of posts. However,
from an economic point of view this fact is extremely important because it
aects the outcomes predicted by the economic model in intriguing ways, as the
appearance of equilibria with non-uniform prices shows. In lack of a particular
structure of posts suggested by the economic model, it is not clear which is the
game underlying the economy. Thus, it is necessary to develop a foundation




Proof of Claim 5.1 Suppose the claim is not true. Then for some agent h 2 H there














































h = 0 (otherwise we can nd another feasible strategy for
which this is true while, at the same time, prices, allocations and budget remain
unchanged). Note that, given our assumptions on preferences and endowments, the














































h > 0; 
i;r
h > 0; s 6= r
o
.
- Step I Consider the commodities i 2 L3 (i.e., the commodities where the consumer
is a net buyer in one trading post and a net seller in the other).













































































































Therefore, by shifting a proportion of the bid (oer) from the rst trading post to
the second and at the same time shifting the same proportion of the oer (bid) from
the second to the rst, the consumer can achieve an allocation which is at least as
good as the original (keeping the strategy xed in the other commodities). Notice































We conclude then that if the consumer can improve over the rst allocation by a
selling-buying strategy, then he can do so by either selling or buying in both trading
posts. Hence, we can assume without loss of generality that L3 = ;.
- Step II Consider now i 2 L1 (i.e., the commodities where the consumer is a net
purchaser in both trading posts).










































































which can be solved to yield:
̂ih =











ti  (1  ti) B
i








In other words the agent h could receive the same net trade of commodity i in the








- Step III Now consider the commodities i 2 L2 (i.e., those commodities for which
the consumer is a net seller in both trading posts).
In this case the consumer's net trade is :  (i;1h +
i;2



































































(1  ti) Qi h + 
i;2
h
This equation can be readily solved to obtain:
̂ih =











ti  (1  ti) Qi h + (1  ti)














Therefore, this strategy would give the consumer a net trade in commodities i 2 L2
that would be at least as big as the one with oers in two trading posts.
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which contradicts the fact that (bh; qh)h2H is a Nash equilibrium for the game E
1. So
our original hypothesis is ruled out and our claim is proved 2
Proof of proposition 5.2:
We prove that x 2 E(E1). The rest follows as a consequence of the previous result.
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Let (b; q) 2 NE(Et) be the prole of strategies which gives rise to the allocation x.
By assumption: pi;s = pi;r = pi for s 6= r. Recall that by corollary 3.2 this implies
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L


















2 S1 for all h 2 H . Furthermore, it is easy to see that (b̂h; q̂h) is






































































Thus, with the prole (b̂h; q̂h)h2H in the game E
1 each individual obtains the same


































We claim that (b̂; q̂) 2 NE(E1).





































2 Sth for agent h dened as follows: for





















By (17) and the fact that (h; h) has been assumed feasible, it follows that given
(ba; qa)a6=h, the strategy dened in (20) is budget feasible for the individual h. Fur-

















































for all s 6= r. It follows that:




























































But the last term is exactly the net trade that h receives with the strategy (h; h)










































































which contradicts the hypothesis that (b; q) 2 NE(Et) 2
20
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